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Lieutenant General Roméo Dallaire, as force commander for the United Nations Mission for
Rwanda (UNAMIR) and the ﬁgure most associated with the infamous mission, has often been ac-
cused of providing poor leadership that ultimately failed to prevent the outbreak of genocide in
April 1994. To evaluate this claim, it is necessary to analyze Dallaire’s actions prior to the outbreak.
By looking at his personal suitability, situational nuances, and moments of opportunity during the
UNAMIR mission between October 1993 and April 1994, it is possible to form an accurate assess-
ment of Lieutenant General Dallaire’s leadership in Rwanda and its relation to the development of
the catastrophe. This article will demonstrate that prior to the death of Rwandan President Juvenal
Habyarimana, Dallaire succeeded in fulﬁlling UNAMIR’s directives despite resistance on all sides.
This assessment disproves arguments that his failure in leading UNAMIR was a primary contribut-
ing factor to the outbreak of the Rwandan Genocide.
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Introduction
Lieutenant General Roméo Dallaire’s United Nations (UN) mission to Rwanda is often
interpreted through the prism of the genocide that exploded months after the peace-
keeping force arrived. The majority of the literature on the mission, including ofﬁcial
UN summary publications, has focused on the colonial and pre-1990s national conﬂicts,
glossing over the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) until the onset of the
genocide on 6 April 1994.1 In this context, the plane crash that killed President Juvénal
Habyarimana and marked the beginning of the 100-day massacre became just another
step toward chaos for the troubled nation. This paper will argue that this view places
undue blame on UNAMIR’s military leadership for the genocide’s occurrence and dis-
regards UNAMIR’s successes prior to the crash when Dallaire was able to manage the
evolving scenario and the limitations of the UN mandate with skill and resourcefulness.
Until the crash, the situation in Rwanda had been volatile but had presented opportu-
nities for Dallaire and UNAMIR to genuinely further the aims of the Arusha Accords.
In the face of numerous stumbling blocks, Dallaire’s tenure prior to the crash was a ten-
tative success. Once the plane crashed in Kigali, neither Dallaire nor any other element
of the UN had the capability or speed to address and halt the rising tide of genocide.
The true measure of his success or failure in Rwanda can only be judged by looking at
the days before 6 April 1994.
This argument will establish the criteria by which Dallaire’s leadership of the
Rwanda mission can be judged a success or failure. With a realistic evaluation of the
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resources available and the nature of the UNAMIR mandate, success will be deﬁned as
the keeping of peace, the maintenance of the ceaseﬁre, and the facilitation of political
processes toward the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement. Conversely, a
failing mission would be deﬁned by the resumption of large-scale military aggression
and the practical inability to facilitate meetings and uniﬁed political gatherings. This
corresponds with Paul Diehl’s suggested criteria for evaluating peacekeeping operations
by “how well an operation deterred or prevented violent conﬂict in its area of deploy-
ment; and how much it facilitated ‘resolution of the disagreements underlying the con-
ﬂict.’”2
Dallaire’s suitability must be evaluated for the peacekeeping mission, but also for
the complicated forces at play in Rwanda. Aside from his own suitability, it must also
be determined whether any other potential leader had a chance of success, or whether
the mission was already troubled prior to his appointment as force commander (FC).
Diehl and Daniel Druckerman have raised concerns over the use of the “lessons
learned” approach to analyzing peacekeeping, which promotes methods that have
worked well in the past with little investigation into why they were effective and
whether they are applicable to different situations.3 This is very much the attitude that
has been used to measure Dallaire’s performance. His evaluation in respect to the
UNAMIR mission has been based primarily on its ﬁnal, violent outcome. This argu-
ment will instead attempt to analyze his tenure from his arrival until the airplane crash
in an effort to understand leadership in peacekeeping missions as more than a matter of
responsibility, but as having a unique set of challenges and requirements which need to
be further studied and structured in order to strengthen future missions. By looking at
pivotal moments to determine whether Dallaire piloted these events toward the best
possible outcome, a more accurate measurement of his proﬁciency as force leader can
be formed, and the argument that his leadership was a contributing element to the
genocide can be refuted.
Once Dallaire was made force commander, what mission was he to lead? The man-
date of the UNAMIR mission is a key element in this appraisal. The mission he believed
he was undertaking and the means he understood to be available gave him an image of
the mission that would be violently disrupted by the reality of Rwanda. While the situa-
tion on the ground changed under his feet, the necessary adaptations to his formal man-
date languished in the bureaucratic paper trays of UN Headquarters (UNHQ) in New
York. This situation was both a functional and ideological constraint on Dallaire’s abil-
ity to react and reassess as opportunities as challenges arose.
The obstacles and opportunities that arose during the UNAMIR mission were the
showcase of Dallaire’s competency as force leader. These scenarios began to shape the
progress of the mission before it even touched down in Kigali, and continued to do so
until the 6 April 1994 death of President Habyarimana. Beginning with the 21 October
1993 coup in neighboring Burundi and followed by the complications of the Belgian
peacekeeping contingent and the deﬁciencies of the majority of the force, the political
concerns surrounding Special Representative to the Secretary-General (SRSG) Jacques-
Roger Booh-Booh and the informant Jean-Pierre’s report of weapons caches in Kigali,
Dallaire was confronted with a number of critical moments. The paths he chose and his
reactions to obstructions would reveal the true measure of his leadership.
This investigation will look into whether there was still hope that a controlled—if
not entirely peaceful—environment could be maintained by the UN force at each
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turning point, and will ask whether the mission was fated to fail before it even began. It
will be argued that the possibility of success remained, under the leadership of Dallaire,
until the night the presidential jet crashed just outside of the Kigali airport.
Dallaire’s Suitability for the Situation
Evaluating Dallaire’s potential for success in the months leading up to 6 April 1994 re-
quires examining his qualities as a leader and, more speciﬁcally, his suitability for the
role of force commander of the Rwanda mission. Doing so requires ﬁrm guidelines for
the FC’s role in relation to other leaders involved in the mission.4 Dallaire’s position
made him responsible for the military and security concerns of UNAMIR. His superiors
assured him that his ﬁrst peacekeeping mission was to be a “relatively tranquil affair.”5
Matters of politics and diplomacy were assigned to SRSG Booh-Booh. Dallaire was to
be subordinate to Booh-Booh, who—as the political leader of UNAMIR—was intended
to be a “special representative to lead the mission and provide the diplomatic glue that
would make sure the Arusha Accords didn’t come unstuck.”6 In the fulﬁllment of the
Arusha Accords and the establishment of Rwanda’s new government structure, Dal-
laire’s role was to be one of facilitation, not implementation.
This suited Dallaire, who has been described as a “NATO man,” implying that his
military knowledge had been shaped by the needs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation (NATO) during the Cold War, rather than a “UN man” experienced in the com-
plex political machinations of peacekeeping operations.7 Aware of his inexperience with
the political and social elements of UN forces, Dallaire selected Major Brent Beardsley—
who at the time was involved in the drafting of the Canadian Forces peacekeeping man-
ual—to assist him and supplement his knowledge of UNHQ and peacekeeping.8 Dallaire
was not an experienced UN force leader, but he understood himself to be centered in a
support network that would supplement his deﬁciencies in this respect.
Measuring Roméo Dallaire’s personal suitability for the Rwandan mission reveals
that his deﬁciencies in experience were mitigated by his suitability to the nature of the
conﬂict. Dallaire’s experience with cultural and linguistic plurality in society was
ingrained from his youth and the earliest stages of his career. As a young man in Quebec
during the era of the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) Crisis, René Lévesque’s Parti
Québecois, and as a bilingual soldier in a predominantly Anglo military, Dallaire was
well versed in cultural tensions and prejudices.9 He was also experienced in actively navi-
gating and ﬁnding solutions to the barriers created by language and ingrained relations.10
This was a valuable asset in Rwanda, where the negotiations faltered between the
French-speaking Rwandan government forces (RGF) and a largely anglicized Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF).11 Both conceptually and linguistically, Roméo Dallaire was able to
comprehend dynamics between the two antagonists that other military ﬁgures could not.
These skills were mobilized when SRSG Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh failed to act
proactively in his political role. Rather than supplying essential political leadership, Dal-
laire felt that Booh-Booh was unable to provide any innovation and at times even rea-
sonable aid in response to a volatile situation.12 In his own memoir of the UNAMIR
mission, Booh-Booh would argue that the lack of movement could be blamed on the
intransigence of the Rwandan political class.13 Booh-Booh’s own publication, a clear
attempt at a rebuttal to Dallaire’s claims, called this view of his role a “puerile dream”
and often chastised Dallaire for his political ventures.14 Nonetheless, Dallaire frequently
attended the often frustrating political meetings between Rwandans, for which his dep-
uty commander, Henry Kwami Anyidoho, acknowledged him.15 He found that his
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language skills led him to act as translator between the English-speaking RPF and
French-language representatives of the Rwandan government. He later claimed it was
this role as a linguistically neutral ﬁgure that gave him greater access and comprehen-
sion in Rwanda and motivated communication with all sides.16 Faced with a mission
leader whom he found at best uninterested and at worst negligent, Dallaire proved that
he was not only willing, but particularly well suited to bridging the personnel gaps at
UNAMIR’s highest levels.
While experience with antagonistic cultural plurality and bilingualism were valu-
able tools in the Rwandan conﬂict, they do not single Dallaire out as one uniquely well
suited to the mission. Other nations could have provided military leaders with similar
characteristics, but what they did not have was the connection to Rwanda found in Can-
ada. Deliberations between the RPF and RGF had identiﬁed Canada in particular as a
prospective nation from which to draw a peacekeeping commander.17 While a Western,
bilingual nation, it was free of the colonial history of comparable European states.18
Positive impressions of Canada had been developed in Rwanda during the decades after
the 1960s decolonization, when Canadian relations with the African nation were tied
strongly to education and philanthropy.19 These positive bonds made Dallaire a desir-
able leader for the UN’s military force. It also meant that Dallaire was entering an arena
where key players had been inﬂuenced by his own cultural heritage and experiences.
Considering his linguistic and cultural suitability to Rwandan society, Dallaire
seems to have emerged as the most viable candidate for leadership. His own civilian
and military experiences ﬁtted him to the organizational and social characteristics of
the Rwandan conﬂict. His character was said to ﬁt well into the African culture, with
less cool reserve than many of his anglophone contemporaries.20 He was described as
energetic, charismatic, patient, principled, and hard-working, sometimes to the irrita-
tion of others, but often to the beneﬁt of his leadership position.21
As a leader, he was versed in the realities of modern peacekeeping. When troops
under his command were sent to join UN forces in Yugoslavia and Cambodia, Dallaire
discovered the vulnerability and possibility of casualties among peacekeepers in regions
where conﬂict continued to spark.22 He recognized this risk in his own mission once on
the ground and was subsequently aware of it during his decision-making processes. Dal-
laire was a man who ﬁt the needs of the situation and culture of Rwanda, had his own
knowledge of the dynamics of national conﬂict, and had a strong career as a military
leader.
One of the elements he did lack for an African mission was being from the conti-
nent himself. While the UN often tried to give a regional character to African missions,
the front-runner for the position, a Nigerian general leading the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) observer mission in Rwanda before the UN’s arrival, left much to be de-
sired. This ofﬁcer’s own men informed Dallaire during his observations of Rwanda prior
to UNAMIR’s establishment that the general had abandoned the military observers he
had been charged with in the midst of a break in the cease-ﬁre in the de-militarized zone
(DMZ), retreating to Kigali and leaving them to fend for themselves.23 This was not the
strong military ﬁgure necessary for a mission that depended as much on its control of
minds as its control of bodies. Dallaire was a man who could lead and interact with his
own men, and decipher the Rwanda that confronted him.
His primary role was to be the military leader of the UNAMIR force; as such, his
military background is an important measure of his suitability for the mission. Dallaire
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was not an experienced UN peacekeeping soldier, nor were his inclinations to be partic-
ularly aggressive. In the post-Cold War era, the nature of peacekeeping was beginning
to undergo a drastic change. Without the divisive inﬂuence of Western-Soviet conﬂict,
new and more complex dimensions were becoming apparent.24 Even experienced UN
peacekeepers were entering theaters that were unfamiliar and evolving beyond their
ﬁelds of reference. Criticisms of Dallaire’s foundations as an artillery ofﬁcer are valid for
the technical nature of the mission, which was not combat-based or heavily armed.25
However, the characteristics of an artillery ofﬁcer as outlined by the Canadian Forces
are highly compatible with the challenges the Rwanda mission produced. The artillery
ofﬁcer was to expect “long hours under stress both by day and night . . . to be out of
doors with little shelter in all weather, often in physically demanding conditions.”26
In response to this environment, artillery ofﬁcers were expected to perform as superior
leaders, especially among subordinates, and to possess physical and mental strength
and stamina, methodical and mature judgment, and the ability to perform steadily and
quickly while under great stress.27 Dallaire’s mobilization of these transferable skills
from his artillery leadership role to the Rwandan arena shows his suitability as a new
leader in a new kind of peacekeeping. His deputy commander Henry Kwami Anyidoho
afﬁrmed in his own work on UNAMIR that Dallaire was “a high calibre ofﬁcer that one
rarely comes across . . . a courageous leader who showed the way and we all followed.”28
As a ﬁnal measure of his suitability to UNAMIR, Dallaire’s resistance to aggressive
displays of force was an important feature of his success prior to the outbreak of geno-
cide. While he was not against pre-emptive displays of action or a strong defensive
stance, Dallaire’s insistence on control among his men was essential in preventing out-
breaks of public violence or internal disruptions for months before the crash. From UN
force observations and intelligence on Hutu extremists included in Dallaire’s cables to
the UN, it was evident that the forces of the RGF and its paramilitary organizations
were actively agitating an already volatile situation.29 RGF elements participated in
mass demonstrations during key events in the peace process—armed, but in plain
clothes—hoping to incite the crowds and the UN forces protecting politicians. Their
aim was to set off violence that would reignite the Rwandan conﬂict and to target
UNAMIR’s Belgian troops in order to prompt their withdrawal.30 By promoting calm
and measured actions and disciplining those who crossed behavioral and disciplinary
lines, Dallaire proved that his even temperament and reservation were an appropriate
approach in a volatile situation not only prone to violence, but at times speciﬁcally
working to incite it.31
L.Gen Dallaire’s strengths and weakness reﬂect the reality of UN peacekeeping pro-
cesses. In the United Nations, the force commander and the head of peacekeeping mis-
sions are both appointed by the secretary-general.32 This detail is not highlighted in
order to redirect blame or responsibility for the outcome of missions onto the secretary-
general, but to raise the question of the need for well-reviewed guidelines in the selec-
tion of force leaders. This would likely require matching those individuals selected for
their suitability to the mission, such as Dallaire, with the necessary training and guid-
ance in the intricacies of modern peacekeeping that he was not provided with. Such an
arrangement would also allow for a greater forum for communication that could build
future leaders of peace operations. While Dallaire had proven himself to be a strong
leader in the Canadian Forces, there is much that could have been done to support him
further as leader of a UN mission.
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Initial Appraisal of the Situation
In order to understand the character of the UNAMIR mission, it is important to under-
stand Rwanda as it was seen at the time, without the beneﬁts of hindsight, and with a
view to Dallaire’s responsibilities as a military leader for the UN Department of Peace-
keeping Operations (DPKO). Determining whether Dallaire’s actions up to 6 April
1994 can be considered successful requires an understanding of what potential for reso-
lution the UN believed existed in Rwanda. If the scenario in Rwanda was massively un-
derestimated prior to commencement, can the standard concept of success as non-
violence and the development of democracy still be applied?
In the 1980s, Rwanda found itself in a position of secure—though not ideal—gover-
nance under the dictatorship of Juvénal Habyarimana. For more than 15 years, Habyar-
imana had ruled over a country which was pragmatically described as “in general one of
the least bad in Africa if one considers only its actions and not its intellectual underpin-
nings.”33 However, stability fell and racial tensions rose as economic downturns struck
the nation. The coffee and tin industries—highly important for the Rwandan econ-
omy—collapsed, and the tiny nation became dependent on foreign aid as its main
source of income. Leaning on traditional links between Rwanda and France, Habyari-
mana loosened his monopoly on public power after French president François Mitter-
rand advised him that democratization was paramount in maintaining a ﬂow of
international aid.34 While the opening of politics to opposition parties was in keeping
with changes being made in many nations following the collapse of the Soviet Union, it
stirred up civil conﬂict in Rwanda. The racialized political tensions between Hutu and
Tutsi citizens and exile populations erupted in the early 1990s. Composed largely of ex-
iled Tutsi living as refugees in Uganda after decades of conﬂict in their homeland, the
RPF launched an offensive against the ruling Habyarimana government.35 The resultant
civil war was the catalyst for international intervention in the African state.
UNAMIR’s aim was to monitor the enforcement of the Arusha Accords, the com-
plicated resolution proposed to end the war. Many outside politicians and diplomats be-
lieved that these accords presented the best opportunity for establishing a new
governance system between the warring factions.36 One American representative,
Herman J. Cohen, embodied the optimistic view of the UN by stating, in April 1993,
that “in terms of the Arusha agreement moving forward, [he] did not consider a non-
implementation scenario.”37 Much of the UN saw Rwanda as a chance to revitalize its
damaged peacekeeping reputation following recent missions in Somalia and Yugosla-
via.38 In 1993, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali considered Rwanda “the
site of a unique experiment in preventative diplomacy—which was supposed to be the
ﬁrst step in averting war . . . and the experiment [was] on the verge of success.”39 SRSG
Booh-Booh was clearly dedicated to the structure of the Arusha agreement and com-
plained that Dallaire did not understand the need to have the conﬁdence of all Arusha
signatories, even once the agreement no longer effectively addressed the shifting dy-
namics of the conﬂict.40 This level of optimism toward a successful Rwandan peace was
passed on to Dallaire as the truth of the scenario. In an interview, Dallaire himself stated
that the atmosphere at the UN during the formation of his mission plan was decidedly
optimistic:
The information we received from the international community and from the UN,
who were monitoring and assisting the peace agreement, led us to believe that the
mission would be a success. There would be some friction and there was a sense of
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urgency surrounding our deployment. But both sides had come to UN HQ in New
York and said that they wanted the peacekeeping mission to happen. It was per-
ceived as a classic low-budget Chapter 6 mission.41
A “classic” Chapter 6 peacekeeping mission was based on the idea of the “Paciﬁc
Settlement of Disputes” and lacked a Chapter 7 mission’s capacity for physical enforce-
ment regarding “Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of
Aggression.”42 On the direction of the organization sponsoring his efforts and already
investigating the conﬂict, Dallaire initially perceived that his would be an achievable
mission in a willing nation.
In reality, Dallaire was not fully informed of the true nature of the Rwandan conﬂict.
A well-trained and respected soldier, he was admittedly not a political specialist, nor was
he adequately equipped with one on his initial investigative technical mission.43 In a
complex political situation with multiple players, the mission lacked adequate political
analysis and understanding. The Rwandan nation may have desired peace and stability,
but its leaders did not.44 Vital information that could have aided Dallaire and altered his
mission plan dramatically was withheld or simply not communicated to the DPKO
through the often convoluted and competitive structure of UN departments.45 A Human
Rights Watch report completed in 1993 outlined the trends of violence and rights viola-
tions that were already occurring in Rwanda. Even the Network Zero organization—
anti-Tutsi “squads” formed across the nation associated with high-level ﬁgures like First
Lady Agathe Habyarimana and central to the promotion and preparation for the geno-
cide—was speciﬁcally identiﬁed by observers in the region before Dallaire’s arrival.46
Despite warnings that any response to the Rwandan situation needed to be properly
equipped to address these concerns, Dallaire was not aware of the report until after his
return to Canada, after the 100 days of genocide had already consumed the country.47
Even the World Bank failed to pass on vital information about Rwanda’s militarization
to the UN, considering it unnecessary to inform the Security Council of its knowledge of
arms shipments arriving into the country.48 This lack of information likely inﬂuenced
Dallaire’s determination that while a mission force of 5,500 would be ideal, a “reasonable
viable option” of a 2,500-strong force could still complete the mission while passing the
UN’s austere approval standards for mission size and cost.49 It was with this dearth of
knowledge and barely adequate force strength that Dallaire would face the challenges of
Rwanda. If he was to succeed, he would have to do so with a less-than-ideal force in a
scenario more complex than he could have known. This was the challenge Dallaire faced
from his arrival on 22 October 1993 to the night of 6 April 1994.50
Crisis Point
To understand why an investigation into Roméo Dallaire’s success must begin before
April 6, the plane crash that resulted in the death of President Habyarimana must be
clearly understood as the critical fracture point in the Rwandan conﬂict. The event and
its direct repercussions removed Dallaire’s ability to act in any meaningful way toward
the establishment of peace. A survivor of the genocide focused the restricted nature of
Dallaire’s response on the rising tide of violence after the crash:
We wondered what on earth UNAMIR was doing in Rwanda. . . . [They] could not
even lift a ﬁnger to intervene and prevent the death of tens of thousands of inno-
cent people who were being killed under their very noses. . . . An institution must
have the capacity to be effective. But the UN protects no one.51
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While some have stated that UNAMIR’s “greatest challenge” was to stop the kill-
ings, in reality this was neither its purpose nor within its ability.52 Dallaire had not been
sent to Rwanda to ﬁght for peace, only to facilitate it. He would later recall that in the
face of the rising violence “UNAMIR’s hands essentially remained tied.”53 He posited
that if he had been provided with a contingent able to convince Rwandans it was “risk-
ier to go [out] . . . than stay at home, we could have stopped it.”54 Unfortunately, the
reality of UN dynamics and logistics made the plausibility of this a moot point. If pro-
viding a monitoring force during ceaseﬁre was considered impractical by the US or UK,
volunteering troops when the element of risk escalated was too foolish to even consider.
Unwilling to increase support in the months prior to the crash, the UN certainly would
not send in troops after it.55
Habyarimana’s death irreparably destabilized the nation. Ignace, a Hutu inter-
viewed by author Alain Destexhe during his post-genocide research in Rwanda, was
one of the many génocidaires who rose from the wreckage of the crash. He recalled the
new, collective sentiment that formed following it.56 Ignace told of a radical Hutu ele-
ment that “no longer worried about who had followed the teachings of the presidential
party or the teachings of a rival party. We forgot all quarrels, and who had fallen out
with whom in the past. We kept only one idea in the pot.”57 That idea was genocide.
This was mirrored in the international connections around the Rwandan peace set-
tlements. Habyarimana was the conduit between Rwandan politics and the interna-
tional community.58 The inﬂammatory Hutu radio station Radio Télévision Libre des
Milles Collines (RTLM) encouraged the public to “stand up, take action . . . without
worrying about international opinion.”59 Many did just that. A witness to the genocide
later revealed that the violence “did not become widespread until extremists saw the
world would not get involved and that UNAMIR’s contingents would protect only
themselves.”60 Hutu radicals were no longer held back by the inﬂuence of the interna-
tional community embodied in an established leader or UNAMIR. Habyarimana’s
death released the ties that had kept intent from becoming action.61
Colonel James Allen, who had led peacekeeping missions before retiring from the
military to become a journalist, shamed Dallaire. He chastised him for not diving into
the conﬂict in the “best military tradition,” which would have been tantamount to sui-
cide for his troops, yet at the same time criticized him for allowing the deaths of the Bel-
gian soldiers on security detail with Prime Minister Madame Agathe.62 Allen argued
that Dallaire’s Canadian contemporary, Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, chief of staff
in the 1992 UN mission in Yugoslavia, would not have failed as he believed Dallaire
had.63 Yet, in his contradictory disapproval of both action and inaction, it is hard to
determine what outcome he would have considered a success. Deputy Commander
Anyidoho later reinforced Dallaire’s pragmatic stance, questioning the wisdom of pla-
cing UN forces “with basically only personal weapons . . . in the face of belligerents who
were armed to the teeth.”64 While morality obligated action, it was not a practical or
political possibility in Rwanda in 1994. The ﬂood gates had been opened and no one
man, whether willing or recalcitrant, masterful or inept, could close them.
Mandate
The UN’s approval of Dallaire’s proposal for a force of 2,500 led to the creation of the
mission mandate for UNAMIR. However, it was not the only outline that would be cre-
ated in the early months of the mission. The political and military settlement in Rwanda
had been created through the Arusha Peace Accords, the heavily debated peace
Leadership of Roméo Dallaire 191
© 2012 Genocide Studies and Prevention 7, no. 2/3 doi: 10.3138/gsp.7.2/3.184
agreement made in Arusha, Tanzania, between the RPF, RGF, and other Rwandan par-
ties.65 The Arusha Accords called for a neutral international force to assist in imple-
menting the new government structure and maintaining the unsteady truce between the
sides. However, the creators of the accords recognized to a greater degree that “peace-
keeping cannot be an end in itself—it merely buys time.”66 African politicians and insi-
ders were becoming aware that the possibility of force would be a vital element to any
response. However, the response they wanted and the force they received had consider-
able differences. Arusha outlined a mission which would have secured the country as a
whole, taken part in actions such as arms conﬁscations, and enforced security. Both
unwilling and unable to ﬁnd funding or willing participants, the UN watered down
these strong aims, cutting down the geographic reach and the force’s bite, replacing
conﬁscation with mediation, and security with monitoring.67 The UN mandate con-
sisted of eight roles for the UNAMIR force:
a. to contribute to the security of the city of Kigali, inter alia, within a weapons-secure
area established by the parties in and around the city
b. to monitor observance of the cease-ﬁre agreement . . .
c. to monitor the security situation during the ﬁnal period of the transitional Govern-
ment’s mandate, leading up to the elections
d. to assist with mine clearance, primarily through training programmes
e. to investigate . . . instances of alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the Pro-
tocol of Agreement on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties, and
to pursue any such instances with the parties responsible and report . . . as appropri-
ate to the Secretary-General
f. to monitor the process of repatriation of Rwandese refugees and resettlement of dis-
placed persons . . .
g. to assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities . . . with relief op-
erations
h. to investigate and report on incidents regarding the activities of the gendarmerie and
police68
The primary intent of the mandate was to monitor and assist the Rwandans in
their progress toward a peaceful settlement. While the mandate initially appeared to be
a sufﬁcient outline for the simple mission the UN believed Rwanda to be, in truth the
situation was much more complex than the mandate recognized.
The mandate itself presented numerous problems. It was formed at a time in 1993
when the DPKO’s perception of Rwanda was simplistic and uncomplicated. As such,
Dallaire did not consider the exact semantics of the mandate to be of great importance.
Without the anticipation of active and widespread violent elements in Rwanda, it was
not important that the speciﬁc wording could eventually prevent UNAMIR forces from
engaging with violent mobs or individuals.69 Due to these expectations, the mandate
was also formulated around traditional perceptions of peacekeeping operations. It pre-
supposed goodwill, respect, and cooperation from both sides of the conﬂict so that UN
forces could remain a neutral force between them.70 When this was discovered to be
untrue, the need to institute ﬂexibility into the mandate to address the shifting situation
on the ground was heightened.71
Further, the generic quality of the mandate gave Dallaire a wider impression of his
options than the UN had conceived. In an interview, Dallaire spoke of
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the impasse over philosophy and interpretation of the mandate. I saw my mandate
as “6-plus,” which gave me a certain amount of room for manoeuvre. DPKO saw it
in a much more restrictive sense, because of the fear of casualties and so on.72
In the spirit of a “six-plus” mandate that gave room for military actions in the face
of threats to human rights, Dallaire produced the guiding document for UNAMIR that
elaborated on the outline in the mandate: his rules of engagement (ROE). In UN opera-
tions, the ROE are written by the commanding ofﬁcer after the establishment of the
mission. Upon reaching this stage, Dallaire took what he perceived to be the open spirit
of the mandate and shaped his Rules to ﬁt his scenario. He saw it as his general role to
“create an atmosphere of security,” and to do so, he recycled a portion of the Cambo-
dian peace-enforcement mission’s text, which became paragraph 17 of the ROE.73 Para-
graph 17 stated that the occurrence of crimes against humanity “morally and legally
[required] UNAMIR to use all available means to halt them.”74 Dallaire believed that
this was within the boundaries of his vague mandate, and necessary in light of recent
developments in Rwanda. The UN never responded to his ROE, neither positively or
negatively, and Dallaire took this as a tacit approval of his direction.75
Crossroads
Evaluating Roméo Dallaire’s leadership of the UNAMIR mission prior to 6 April 1994
requires a speciﬁc area of investigation. For this analysis, the most important evidence
is in the decisive moments when conﬂict in Rwanda and the mission determined in
which direction UNAMIR and the nation would go. Dallaire’s ability to lead a success-
ful mission rested less on the stasis of peace, and more on the resolution of conﬂicts
that threatened it. By investigating these moments of conﬂict and their results, it is pos-
sible to evaluate the point at which the mission was or became irredeemable.
Burundi Coup
The ﬁrst crisis that Dallaire faced during the UNAMIR mission arose as he touched
down in Kigali. Arriving on 22 October 1993, Dallaire found that the very fundamentals
of Rwanda’s national situation had changed drastically the day before.76 Along the
southern border of the country lay Burundi, with its own postcolonial legacy of Hutu
and Tutsi conﬂict. The day before Dallaire’s arrival, leaders in the nation’s Tutsi-led
army overthrew and assassinated Hutu president Melchior Ndadaye, who had been re-
cently elected in Burundi’s ﬁrst free elections after 30 years of Tutsi dictatorship.77 This
coup had several repercussions on the Rwandan situation. In the wake of reprisals from
Hutu and Tutsi, 300,000 mostly Hutu refugees crossed the border to camps in southern
Rwanda.78 For Hutu in Rwanda, fears of Tutsi hegemony were escalated by the coup,
providing not only the spark, but also fuel for the ﬁre of charged opposition. Theories
of an overarching Tutsi plot were enﬂamed by radical propaganda that warned against
believing that “what happened in Burundi cannot happen here.”79 Large Hutu refugee
populations in the south proved to be fertile recruiting ground for the RGF, where
“Hutu Power” grew in a climate of the Hutu nation under siege.80 The lack of Western
reaction and recognition of the Burundi crisis was also compelling evidence to Rwan-
dans of the limitations of international intervention.81 The upset in Burundi did not
only remove the secure southern front Dallaire had depended on, but it also agitated
the conﬂicts and tensions in Rwanda just in time for his arrival.
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This was a key moment for Dallaire’s leadership. He recognized immediately that
“everything had changed. Not only would the coup in Burundi shake the fragile political
situation in Rwanda, but the stable southern ﬂank, which I had relied on in my mission
plan, had vanished.”82 As his ﬁrst test, it was important to set a precedent while reshap-
ing his understanding of the atmosphere. It was essential that the mission did not run
out of hand within its ﬁrst days. In response, he reorganized according to the increased
security requirements. Dallaire immediately requested an increased force from the UN.
The DPKO informed Dallaire that the troops were not requested in the initial mission
report, ﬁled before the coup had occurred, and as such would not be added on at that
point.83 Establishing an element of stability in southern Rwanda would require the jug-
gling of his already limited personnel to a region he had not intended to staff heavily.
Dallaire stretched his force of unarmed military observers into the south to maintain
UNAMIR presence throughout the unsettled nation.84 Determined to make higher
powers aware of the heightened tensions, Dallaire continued to report to the UN that
the stretching of UNAMIR’s forces in this new environment would require taking more
risks. It was not ideal, but it was a reality he was willing to work with. In his reports,
Dallaire gave a realistic but positive look at the situation and needs, recognizing his
responsibility to protect the Rwandan peace and his own contingent. It was not until
after the mission that he found out that SRSG J. R. Booh-Booh had watered down his
expressions of concern to a picture of slow and steady progress before allowing them to
reach the UN.85 At the time, Dallaire was painted as a cowboy and Booh-Booh’s reports
were considered more balanced and understanding of the situation.86 In the aftermath,
it would appear that these perceptions were not an accurate representation of events.
The situation in Rwanda at this time was not out of hand. Radicals did not take
advantage of the chaos in Burundi to mount their own political or military action in
Rwanda and Dallaire was able to establish a monitoring force that fulﬁlled UNAMIR’s
needs in the south. While tensions had been raised and racial rhetoric spread, it was not
obvious at that point that widespread genocidal chaos would ensue as a direct result.
Force Dynamics
Dallaire’s second challenge arose with the arrival of the various national groups that
formed the UNAMIR forces. Without the support of large nations such as Great Britain
or the United States, the UNAMIR contingent was composed largely of forces from
smaller nations in Asia and Africa. The only signiﬁcant Western elements were the Bel-
gians. While their skills and experience were essential to the success of Dallaire’s mis-
sion, they had their own complications. They arrived with limited supplies and
equipment, although more than other contingents, and fresh from assignment in the
Somalian conﬂict. When further equipment did arrive, the long distances involved in
their transportation to Rwanda left most machinery and vehicles broken and stripped
of vital components.87 Furthermore, the colonial history of Belgium as an oppressive
power in Rwanda made their contribution to the force controversial at best. Dallaire
was faced with the added complication of dealing with Belgian para-commandos fresh
from active conﬂict in Somalia and used to peace enforcement, not peacekeeping.88
Their attitude and the environment they were accustomed to encouraged aggressive
behavior that did not mesh with UNAMIR’s methods. However, as his only signiﬁcant
Western force, Dallaire needed the Belgians as a controlling and secure inﬂuence in a
complex environment. Dallaire would become aware in the course of the following
months that the Belgian soldiers were speciﬁcally targeted for agitation by radicals trying
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to get Belgium to withdraw from the force in the face of casualties.89 They were a target
for disturbances and worsened the situation by actively creating problems for the mis-
sion. The best example occurred when the Belgian protective detail supporting the transit
of RPF representatives to Kigali abandoned them in the face of attack. Dallaire reported
that the “shame this incident brought on UNAMIR forces was never expunged.”90 The
Belgian contingent was both a blessing and a curse to Dallaire and to UNAMIR.
The majority of UNAMIR’s forces were provided by poorly prepared and under-
supplied “Third World” nations. These soldiers were promoted as “highly motivated, if
less well trained.”91 In reality, many arrived with broken or outdated equipment, little
to no supplies, and without the training or desire to meet UNAMIR’s challenges.92 For
Dallaire, the Bangladeshi contingent was the epitome of this conundrum. Contributing
nations were required to supply their troops with sixty days of supplies. The Banglade-
shis came without many of the most basic requirements for food and shelter. This was
particularly striking when considering that the Bangladeshi contingent made up the
majority of logistical support units for the mission, including the engineering and medi-
cal services. Dallaire’s deputy commander Henry Kwami Anyidoho of Ghana had
warned him against depending on a developing country to serve as a central element of
UNAMIR’s logistics, but Dallaire countered that Bangladesh was also the only nation
that had offered.93 When he tried to train them as a quick-response force, they proved
unequal to the task, more likely to escalate than improve a high-risk scenario.94 In peri-
ods of tension, Dallaire would discover that they and other contingents would operate
according to orders issued by their country, not by UNAMIR.95 The Bangladeshis and
other, similar force contingents created a constant juggling act for Dallaire to monitor,
supply, and control in the sparse time available outside the maintenance of the mis-
sion’s basic requirements.
In response to these challenges of mission leadership, Dallaire was able to assess
both his personnel and his environment in order to juggle the complex force dynamics.
When the Belgians lost RPF conﬁdence after Belgian soldiers abandoned their duties,
Dallaire modiﬁed the placement of his contingents. Instead of the controversial Bel-
gians, the well-trained Tunisian force was positioned at the RPF headquarters in Ki-
gali.96 Dallaire was also able to use general Belgian presence and participation to the
beneﬁt of the mission, calling on Belgian personnel for intelligence information that
UNAMIR itself lacked. Such changes revealed some ﬂexibility in UNAMIR that allowed
Dallaire to react to challenges. His was a responsive force, not one locked in a down-
ward spiral.
Dallaire also revealed himself to be willing to make difﬁcult decisions for the overall
success of the mission. In response to Belgian forces’ fraternization in Rwandan bars and
with Rwandan women, their aggressive attitude toward Rwandan politicians and impor-
tant ﬁgures, and general insubordination, Dallaire went to the Belgian command, threa-
tening that control had to be established or the continuation of a Belgian presence would
become a greater hindrance than help to UNAMIR.97 Several Belgian soldiers were re-
moved to Belgium in the face of their actions.98 It is difﬁcult to believe that Dallaire
would have been willing to even consider the removal of the Belgian contingent force if
he had thought that large-scale violence was about to break loose across Rwanda.
Political Deﬁciencies
With the establishment of the UN mission in Rwanda, attending to the political require-
ments of the Arusha agreement became a primary concern. Dallaire was aware of his
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position as a military man and hoped that UNAMIR requirements beyond his expertise
would be handled by an effective ally. Dallaire wanted this ally, the special representa-
tive to the secretary-general, to be a military ﬁgure who would lead a French-language
mission in Rwanda. In reality, he received a civilian, Cameroonian Jacques-Roger
Booh-Booh, and a mission with English as the operational language in a primarily
French-speaking region of Africa.99 Booh-Booh was supposed to be the “glue” that
kept the Arusha Accords together, but for Dallaire he was often more divisive than
effective.100 Though the SRSG was a conﬁdant to then UN Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali, he also refused to use his inﬂuence to aid the mission.101 Seemingly
favorably biased toward the former Rwandan government and often damaging to the
vital image of UN neutrality with his numerous personal visits with President Habyari-
mana, Booh-Booh’s ﬁt with the Rwandan mission was awkward at best.102
Politically, Dallaire found Booh-Booh’s diplomatic efforts limited and ﬁlled with
ultimata and threats toward both sides of the civil conﬂict. His communications with
the UN were full of watered-down appraisals and assurances that contributed to a regu-
lar pattern of denial to Dallaire’s requests, even when tensions escalated.103 According
to Dallaire, at one fragile point in February 1994 during political discussions between
the parties to form the new government, Booh-Booh “suddenly pounded the table . . .
and got up, knocking his chair over in his haste. This meeting was going nowhere, he
announced emphatically, and he was not going to waste any more of his time. In fact,
he refused to chair any more such meetings.”104 Deputy Commander Anyidoho stated
a belief that Booh-Booh’s missteps, including his visits with Habyarimana, were done in
innocence of their harm.105 As the senior political ﬁgure for the mission and the sup-
posed diplomatic head of UNAMIR on the ground, it would seem that Booh-Booh
should have had the foresight to understand the implications of his actions in a delicate
political situation. An interview allowed Dallaire to reﬂect on Booh-Booh’s position as
the ﬁgurehead and political leader of UNAMIR:
Booh-Booh was given the task of leading the process, but he was never able
to bring forth innovative ideas. Indeed he seemed, at times, to not be particularly
helpful in bringing along possible solutions. . . . Looking back, it would have
been interesting to have had a political advisor—rather than a political boss—a
solid, experienced diplomat-politician . . . with whom we could have built a
team.106
Booh-Booh would later attempt to contradict this image of himself by arguing that
an arrogant Dallaire struggled under the authority of an African.107 There were no such
similar claims from Dallaire’s other African counterparts.
Dallaire’s response to Booh-Booh’s limitations would reveal both his adaptability
and his continuing belief in the viability of maintaining the Arusha process. He couldn’t
overpower Booh-Booh’s inﬂuence at the UN to argue for the primacy of his mission’s
needs. Instead, Dallaire attempted to ﬁll the diplomatic gap to the best of his own abil-
ity.108 He held and participated in political meetings in an attempt to break deadlocks
on cabinet assignments to the broad-based transitional government (BBTG) proposed
by the Arusha Accords109:
I attended all the political meetings (as the number two of the mission) as the Force
Commander, so not only was I sitting at the table with the SRSG and attempting to
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whisper comments, etc., but I also often found myself being the translator between
the English-speaking RPF and the French-speaking government representatives.
Consequently, a number of people—extremists, Tutsi and Hutu moderates, and so
on—would conduct overt and covert meetings with me.110
Dallaire’s dedication evidences his belief that Arusha was not a lost cause in the
early months of 1994. His attempts at politics contributed to the continual efforts to
resolve those issues involved in installing the BBTG. In his own book on UNAMIR,
Deputy Commander Anyidoho recognized the difﬁculties involved for military leaders
unable to avoid political machinations during a civil conﬂict and the way in which
peacekeepers, including Dallaire, had to be ready to “face all these frustrations to the
point of being humiliated.”111 He would go on to recommend that in recognition of this
emerging challenge, diplomacy become part of the training given to potential peace-
keeping soldiers and military leaders.112 Under the auspices of UNAMIR, attempts were
made to further the government’s formation on January 1, January 5, February 14, Feb-
ruary 23, March 25, March 28, and in early April 1994.113 While it was a frustrating sit-
uation for Dallaire, who admitted he was no expert in political machinations, an overt
consensus on Rwanda’s descent toward destruction did not dominate UNAMIR.
“Jean-Pierre” and Kigali Weapons Caches
A galvanizing possibility for UNAMIR arose in mid-January when Dallaire was pre-
sented with the testimony of an RGF informant code-named “Jean-Pierre.” He claimed
to be a military trainer who was preparing elements of a national militia, the Intera-
hamwe, for acts of mass violence.114 He gave speciﬁc information on the location
of arms caches in Kigali that were intended for distribution. Dallaire saw this informa-
tion—which was veriﬁed by a member of the contingent who was shown the cache by
Jean-Pierre—as a golden opportunity.115 He directly informed the DPKO of his plan to
conduct a raid on the cache, bypassing the SRSG. Believing that the cache was in direct
violation of the Kigali Weapon Secure Area (KWSA), a key element to Arusha and
UNAMIR, Dallaire considered this action to be well within his mandate. The message
to the DPKO was intended as a notice of action, not a request for approval.116 In likely
the fastest response from New York during the mission, a direct notice from DPKO
heads Koﬁ Annan and Iqbal Riza forbade the raid.117 Dallaire was not only told
that this would be in violation of his mandate, but he was instructed that for the pur-
poses of transparency, he had to inform President Habyarimana and his advisors of the
information.118
The action Dallaire was forbidden to take could have been a key stabilizing element
in the Rwandan conﬂict. In a post-conﬂict analysis published by the Pearson Peacekeep-
ing Centre and including input from an OAU report, it was argued that the “power of
presence,” the psychological impact of a force beyond their physical strength, should
not be underestimated in situations like Rwanda.119 The report of UNAMIR knowledge
of the caches turned out to be a shock to the president and his associates.120 The seizure
of the weapons could have had a considerable impact, projecting a more powerful
image of UNAMIR and international control in Rwanda. Instead, the surprise exhibited
by the RGF quickly receded and the distribution of arms from the cache was accelerated
as a result. Dallaire was frustrated by the prohibition on conducting arms raids, which
he believed satisﬁed the original mandate’s requirements for the establishment of
KWSA and contributions to the security of Kigali. Public knowledge of other caches
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and expectations that UNAMIR would address them aggravated this further.121 It had
been an ideal opportunity to gain a grip on the security situation in Kigali. Dallaire
would later learn that his warnings had failed to reach the highest levels of the UN,
including Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, a move that would come to be con-
sidered by some an “incomprehensible” disgrace to the UN structure.122 Others consid-
ered it a failure by Dallaire for not sending the message directly to the highest levels,
even though he was already breaking protocol in bypassing Booh-Booh and sending it
directly to the DPKO.123 In retrospect, Dallaire’s intentions looked to head off problems
that might arise in the future. Yet the disavowal of pre-emptive action was still not a
death sentence to the peace process.
In the period that followed Jean-Pierre’s revelation, Rwanda did not appear to be
facing a downward spiral into mass violence. Violence in February was followed by a
period of calm in March that precipitated the continuation of political discussions.124
Dallaire was aware of the threats radical groups posed, yet “despite increased tensions
and insecurity engendered by the political impasses, the cease-ﬁre was generally hold-
ing. UNAMIR forces . . . continued to play a stabilizing role.”125 Even some Rwandan
politicians were cautiously optimistic. In March 1994, Moderate Faustin Twagiramungu
expressed a belief that the only thing that could possibly stop the Arusha agreements
was a decision by President Habyarimana.126 The comment would become surprisingly
prescient. The day before the crash, UN Resolution 909 of 5 April 1994 “[welcomed]
the fact that, despite the difﬁculties encountered in implementing the Arusha Peace
Agreement, the cease-ﬁre has been respected and commends in this respect the essential
contribution made by UNAMIR.”127 The UN did not yet see that their forces were
stuck in a futile situation and in need of withdrawal. Even though the opportunity pro-
vided by Jean-Pierre’s information was missed, it did not appear that the extreme vio-
lence of the coming days and weeks was a foregone conclusion at this time.
Conclusion
Three dynamics are vital to making any judgment about Dallaire’s performance in
Rwanda; the ﬁrst is his personal and professional suitability to the mission; the second,
the evolving structure of UNAMIR; and the third, his response to key crossroads during
the development of the mission. However, these three dynamics must be considered
within speciﬁc parameters. The plane crash that killed President Juvénal Habyarimana
and precipitated the eruption of violence and genocide is the cut-off point of this inves-
tigation. After this point, it can be seen through an examination of the changes in cir-
cumstance, power, and politics in Rwanda, and the guidelines of the UNAMIR
mandate, that Dallaire had neither the ability nor the authority to respond to the wide-
spread chaos. This is not to limit the importance or gravity of the genocide that would
follow, but to produce an examination of the UNAMIR mission and speciﬁcally Dal-
laire’s leadership that is not biased by the moral responses formed in the aftermath of
the genocide. The literal decimation of Rwanda at its own hands was watched by a
world which cried out at the failure of international forces to stop the ﬂow of blood, the
same world that neglected the efforts to stabilize it, only to then cast it as a catastrophic
failure. Upon examination, there is much more to the legacy of the United Nations
Assistance Mission for Rwanda than the 100 days of genocide in 1994. As a military
leader, Roméo Dallaire had six months of operation during which he maintained an
uneasy peace with a limited pool of resources to draw from. As other peacekeeping ana-
lysts have argued, it may be better to look at the methods and means of Dallaire’s
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leadership that worked and why, rather than the destructive conclusion the country ulti-
mately came to.
Dallaire’s suitability to the Rwandan situation provides the basis for examining his
effectiveness. A leader, no matter how dedicated or capable, can be hindered by the
nature of his approach or lack of environment-speciﬁc skills, such as language or cul-
tural knowledge. For Rwanda, Roméo Dallaire would prove himself to be an effective ﬁt
for an unusual situation. His background, not only as a military ofﬁcer, but as a French-
Canadian integrated into a largely anglicized environment of the Canadian Forces made
him familiar with concepts of minority populations, bilingualism, and cultural preju-
dices so predominant in Rwanda. Although he was inexperienced with UN missions
and his suitability for the position as an artillery ofﬁcer was questioned, Dallaire gath-
ered others with experience into his team for support and used the transferable skills
from his artillery position to adapt to the rigors of Rwanda. In addition, the value of
experience in UN peacekeeping missions in the past, which Dallaire did lack, was com-
plicated by the rapidly changing character of peacekeeping in the immediate post-Cold
War period. The scenarios UN veterans had faced were often vastly different from the
situations they began to ﬁnd themselves in. His nationality was also a particularly good
ﬁt for a mission in Rwanda, as the country’s relations with Canada lacked the specters
of colonialism that European nations represented, and charitable and educational works
had developed a positive impression of Canada since decolonization. Dallaire, as a
French Canadian, arrived to ﬁnd that many leading ﬁgures were directly tied to his own
nation, province, and culture in a way few others could have appreciated. These
strengths would be vital to Dallaire in an environment with few other suitable candi-
dates and little support from the UN’s political elements in Rwanda and New York.
The structure of the mission reveals both the strengths and weaknesses of the sys-
tem upon which Dallaire depended. The inﬂexibility and ambiguity of the mandate in
response to a rapidly changing situation on the ground limited the requests Dallaire
could make and the actions that he could take. The complications of the UN’s interde-
partmental rivalries and disconnects further hampered Dallaire by depriving him of
information on Rwanda, including arms movements and human rights violations, that
would have been vital elements of the mission’s primary evaluations. Requests for addi-
tional forces, supplies, and support were denied, communications unanswered, and Dal-
laire was left to assume that in his approach to the situation and interpretations of his
options, no news could only be good news. This situation reveals a great deal about Dal-
laire’s determination and the dedication of many members of the UNAMIR mission to
keep it operational, while at the same time revealing the betrayal by UN ofﬁcials who
were meant to be supporting them.
Ultimately, the means to judge Dallaire’s leadership and success in Rwanda in the
period prior to the crash is the examination of his decisions at key crossroads. These re-
sponses reveal whether the mission of maintaining ceaseﬁre and facilitating political
development was still viable. The ﬁrst challenge arose with the coup in Burundi, which
negated the calm southern front Dallaire had depended on in his mission plan. Despite
the contagion of unrest present in the ﬁrst days of the mission, Dallaire was able to real-
locate his forces and begin the planned initiation of UNAMIR on the ground. In estab-
lishing the mission, he would be challenged by complications caused by force dynamics
and personnel deﬁciencies. The complications of poorly provisioned or ill-suited troops
marred the military element and required regular adjustments and reassignments to
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maintain the security and ceaseﬁre of Kigali and Rwanda. The reticence of the political
head of the mission, SRSG Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, forced Dallaire to act as a politi-
cal liaison at many turns, a role beyond his military position and training, but vital to
the overall mission. Dallaire’s greatest test would come with the informant Jean-Pierre.
While potential raids on weapons caches within the KWSA were forbidden by the UN
DPKO hierarchy and may have ultimately been numerically insigniﬁcant, the action
that Dallaire aimed to respond with emphasizes a very different perspective. The
planned raid could have depicted Dallaire as a potential man of action in Rwanda and
made a huge contribution to UNAMIR’s image and control in the region. In a position
hindered by the realities of UN supply issues and mission restrictions, this image was
one of Dallaire’s strongest tools. The decision of the DPKO to forbid the raid struck a
blow to UNAMIR’s perceived effectiveness but did not make it a wholly lost cause.
The UNAMIR mission and the Rwandan genocide are inextricably tied together in
memory as part of an incomprehensible tragedy. In the face of this, the simplest way to
deal with the aftermath was to ﬁnd a scapegoat who could be blamed this “failure of
humanity.” A closer analysis of the situation and the environment, both in Rwanda and
across the international stage, reveals a different story. Investigating the mandate and
mindset of the mission, it can be seen that the outbreak of civil war negated the role of
the forces that were there as peacekeepers, not peace enforcers. UNAMIR and the geno-
cide were unavoidably separated by the crash of President Habyarimana’s plane, and as
such, Roméo Dallaire’s leadership of the UN mission can best be judged in the period
from his arrival on 22 October 1993 to the crash at the Kigali airport on 6 April 1994.
Not only for Dallaire, but for the study of peacekeeping, it is of greater use to under-
stand these months of stability, rather than the ultimate conﬂagration. It is during those
months, when tensions and strains could have lead to a renewal of violence at any time,
that Dallaire’s effectiveness as a peacekeeper can be seen. His actions revealed a suitabil-
ity, resourcefulness, and resilience that pushed the nation toward the process of peace,
or at least barred the way to widespread chaos. When the president’s plane went down,
it took many things with it. A storm of unstoppable events swelled within the nation as
the mission’s mandate was destroyed. Neither Dallaire, nor the slow-moving UN, nor
the unwilling, powerful nations of the world could stop what had begun. The genocide
was a current that swept up everyone within the nation, and destroyed any evidence of
progress in Rwanda, leaving Dallaire vulnerable in the public eye. That narrative ulti-
mately fails to tell the whole story of the UNAMIR mission. Rwanda may have been a
failure of humanity, but it was not Dallaire’s failure alone.
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